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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Sovereignty 
In Tackling Transnational Counterfeits: Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place? 
 
Abstract 
 
Transnational counterfeiting has grown tremendously with the increasing interdependence of 
global economy. The process of illicit financial flow has outpaced the growth of mechanisms 
for global governance, and the resultant deficiency produces regulation vacuum where the 
cross-border crime can thrive. It is very necessary to consider the effect of service process of 
foreign defendants getting evidence. As illustrated in Gucci’s case, the U.S. court face great 
challenges to address extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the context of extraterritorial discovery, it 
remains unresolved how to prioritise competing jurisdictional claims. Remediation is 
compromised due largely to sensitivities over national sovereignty. The broad interpretation of 
sovereignty makes Bank of China (BoC) operate behind a firewall that keeps it immune from 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, leaving the brand owners vulnerable. A deadlock arises between 
proper exercise of extraterritoriality and critical response to the current increasingly complex 
cross-border counterfeiting. At stake are fundamental questions of conflict of laws. A valid 
nexus is indispensable to justify a U.S. court in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 45. Given the unviable course of action via the Hague Conventions, it is argued that 
greater legal protections for U.S. entities via subpoenas are a more feasible solution. In 
response to the global challenge, more multipronged approaches should be adopted to combat 
the transnational counterfeiting crime.   
Introduction 
Counterfeiting undermines international values to the detriment of international order.1 The 
cross-border infringement erodes brand holders’ credibility. Banks are often abused by 
counterfeiters to launder their illicit profits into legitimate funds. Access to their banking 
information plays a key role at the stage of pretrial discovery. 2 The combat against 
counterfeiting has to be conducted on an international scale. A valid nexus turns out to be the 
prerequisite for a U.S. court to assert jurisdiction with due process. The scenario becomes more 
complicated when Bank of China (BoC) only operates through its New York branches. Banks 
are often required to submit to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts as nonparties. In reality, a U.S. 
plaintiff in cross-border counterfeiting litigation faces an insurmountable hurdle when 
attempting to gather discovery from China. In the case of Gucci, the Bank of China (BoC) has 
been involved in concealing illicit operations from counterfeiting. Gucci has been struggling 
to enforce its rights against counterfeiters because they exploit China’s sophisticated legal fire 
walls. This obstacle is reinforced by China’s sensitivity over sovereignty.3 The use of Hague 
Convention to pursue counterfeiters in China results always in unviability due to the 
                                                          
1 Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 953, 976 
2 Aaron Simowitz, ‘Transactional Enforcement Discovery’ (2015) 83 (6) Fordham Law Review 3293, 3342 at 
3304 
3 Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Organized Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering’ in P. J Simmons and    
Chantel Ouderen, Challenges in International Governance (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 2001) 106-150 
at 144 
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institutional void. The BoC has tested the local legal system’s extraterritorial reach, specifically 
how far judges can go in demanding Chinese bank account records.4 Given the ostensible 
futility, brand holders have to resort to U.S. subpoenas for discovery. The Gucci case reflects 
the challenges those plaintiffs faced while they sought legal redress against alleged Chinese 
counterfeiters, which gets them stuck in legal limbo.5  
 
This paper examines avenues to extraterritorial discovery in such a rapidly changing landscape 
of transnational litigation and whether brand owners could gain relief under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 45 (FRCP 45). It seeks to fill the gap in the significant but underdeveloped  
area. The paper proceeds in six parts. Part I examines that whether jurisdiction can be exerted 
on BoC depends upon not only the scope of the New York’s jurisdictional statutes, but also 
safeguards provided by the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 6  It starts with 
jurisdictional analysis in the Daimler case which suggests limits on plaintiffs’ ability to invoke 
the FRCP 45 discovery. In addition, the classical doctrine of separate legal entity amplified in 
Motorola appears to shield foreign financial institutions from exposure to U.S. jurisdictions. 
The BoC in Gucci took tactically advantage of a multinational corporate structure and the 
shroud of Chinese State Secrecy Law. This part paves the way for addressing extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which conflicts with the Chinese law restricting discovery. Part II moves to the 
reasonableness prong of the personal jurisdiction to explore avenues where a plaintiff could 
pursue legal recourse against counterfeiters. This part ascertains which avenue is more 
reasonably attainable and which state’s interests prevail to entail its law applicable. The 
approach must be compatible with the due diligence consideration. Part III examines the 
Second Circuit’s decision that a general jurisdiction does not exist due to insufficient contact. 
It then looks into circumstances where nexus is sufficient to permit extraterritorial discovery 
for the sake of expediting the pretrial procedures. Part IV analyses the doctrine of comity as 
the governing standard in resolving the extraterritorial recovery cases. It further adopts a 
multifactor balancing test to ascertain when a court may assert jurisdiction. Part V analyses the 
classical issue of sovereignty that is particularly sensitive in China. In respect of obstacles to 
secure discovery, the crux is how judges exercise their discretion and how to alleviate 
inconsistent decisions among U.S. courts. To alleviate inconsistent decisions, the court’s 
discretion is at stake when foreign law forbids the discovery. This part examines whether a real 
situation exists between a rock and hard place, which plausibly represents a weighty excuse for 
nonproduction. Part VI proposes to address the current uncertainties by placing these 
challenges in a context of global governance. The theory of consent via registration represents 
one of the most controversial debates. It then seeks to mitigate the deadlock risk in order to 
avoid the exposure to subpoenas for extraterritorial discovery. The resulting legal landscape 
should be the law which can provide more certainty and predictability. The concluding part 
follows in the final part of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Nicole Hong and Lingling Wei, ‘China’s Banks Test U.S. Legal System’ The Wall Street Journal (8 November 
2015) 
5 Kim Ross, ‘Gucci, Tiffany Up Against China’s Great Legal Firewall’ The Style of the Case (12 May 2015)  
6 Lea Brilmayer and Charles Norchi, ‘Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process’ (1992) 105 
Harvard Law Review 1217, 1263 
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A. The Jurisdictional Reach 
 
The concept of jurisdiction plays a key role in the legal scenario of extraterritorial discovery.7 
In the first instance, a U.S. court normally consider whether the due process clause entails 
jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution.8 Another basis to justify the assertion of jurisdiction  
rests with a valid nexus.9 The power of U.S. courts to order compliance with subpoenas has 
remained hotly-debated since the case of Daimler,10 which restricts jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations. The decision in Motorola further impedes the plaintiff from foreign discovery 
based on the seminal doctrine of separate legal entity.11 A general trend has been the narrowing 
of U.S. personal jurisdiction standards.12 
 
1. Daimler AG v. Bauman: “At Home” Test  
Plaintiffs face increased barrier when seeking to sue foreign financial institutions on the ground 
of extraterritoriality. The law governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction has been 
changing dramatically. The Supreme Court in Daimler invoked the Due Process clause of the 
U.S. Constitution to dismiss the case due to the lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler.13 
Previously, general jurisdiction could be established if a defendant was engaged in continuous, 
permanent and substantial activity in New York. 14  The Supreme Court in Daimler has 
substantially altered the analytic landscape for general jurisdiction,15 which has simplified the 
test and set forth a strict standard. It held that a forum State may not exercise general 
jurisdiction unless the foreign entity is “at home”.16 As redefined, an entity to be “at home” 
refers usually to the defendant’s place of incorporation or principle place of operation.17 It 
follows that the foreign entities’ “affiliations with the State must engage in ‘a substantial, 
continuous and systematic’ course of business as to render it essentially at home in the forum 
State”.18 The "essentially at home" test provides a level of certinty previously unavailable to 
foreign defendants. For the first time the Daimler case addressed the question whether, “a 
foreign corporation may be subjected to a court's general jurisdiction based on the contacts of 
                                                          
7Anthony Colangelo, ‘Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of 
National and International Law’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 121, 201 at 126 
8 The Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment (applicable to the federal Government) and 
Fourteenth Amendment (applicable to the States) each prohibit the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property" 
without "due process of law." 
9 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) s402 (1) -(2) 
10 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
11 Motorola Credit Corporation v Standard Chartered Bank, No. 162 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) 
12 Ray Worthy Campbell and Ellen Claar Campbell, ‘Clash of Systems: Discovery in U.S. Litigation Involving 
Chinese Defendants’ (2016) 4 (2) Peking University Transnational Law Review 129, 175 
13 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) at 751 
14 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) 
15 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-761 (2014) 
16 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2013) “A corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state 
by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”; 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)  
18 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-761 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); General jurisdiction, under which a company or person may be sued for any claim, 
even one unrelated to its activities in the forum state, is distinguished from specific jurisdiction, under which a 
company or person only may be sued for claims that arise from purposeful contacts with the forum state; Council 
Regulation 44/2001, art. 60(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 13 (EC) defines similarly to the concept of “at home”, which 
denotes a place where a legal entity has its “(i) statutory seat, or (ii) central administration, or (iii) principal place 
of business”.    
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its in-state subsidiary”.19 However, it is ostensibly hard to reconcile the reasoning that general 
jurisdiction should be construed narrowly. The presence of a branch in the U.S. per se is not 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over an entity which involved conduct that has taken 
place abroad. As Flitter commented, New York branches cannot be used as conduits to export 
U.S. law. 20  The precedent limits the ability of plaintiffs to obtain foreign discovery for 
documents located abroad. Notwithstanding the decision, the Daimler case leaves it open 
regarding a plaintiff’s ability to assert jurisdiction over a corporate parent on the basis of an 
agency theory and its subsidiaries’ contacts with a state.21  
 
2. Does the separate legal entity rule impede discovery?  
 
The doctrine of the separate legal entity may be used to bar extraterritorial discovery sought by 
U.S. litigants. A foreign bank’s New York branch could hide behind complex corporate 
structures.  It is at stake whether the "separate entity" doctrine bars the court from compelling 
a bank's New York branch to produce information pertaining to its overseas entities. The Court 
of Appeals in Koehler ordered a foreign bank to turn over in New York assets held abroad, 
which seems to have abrogated the doctrine of separate entity.22 Nevertheless, it was held 
differently in another court that the doctrine impedes extraterritorial discovery concerning 
assets located overseas.23 As a critical part of New York law, the Motorola case unambiguously 
reaffirms the continued validity of the doctrine.24 On 23 October 2014, the court held that a 
“judgment creditor’s service of a restraining notice on a bank’s New York branch is ineffective 
to freeze assets located in the bank’s foreign branches.” 25 It meant that the bank’s other 
branches shall be deemed separate entities. The freezing order served on the bank’s New York 
branch does not reach accounts held in another country.  
 
The decision significantly weakens the ability of plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction over a parent 
corporation through the operations of its subsidiary. In consequence, a U.S. plaintiff will have 
to gain recognition of a freezing order in the jurisdiction where the account is located. The 
Motorola decision represents a blow to those attempting to use New York Court for subpoenas. 
It raises an issue as to whether the decision blocks litigants from serving discovery on a firm’s 
New York branch seeking documents in the possession, custody or control of its overseas 
branch.26 The application of the doctrine in the context of discovery would be consistent with 
the goal of promoting comity between legal systems, which was not only articulated by the 
Motorola Court but also supported in other Supreme Court decisions.27 A presumption is often 
invoked against extraterritoriality by the court, that is, absent a congressional intent to the 
contrary, statutes are to be construed as having no extraterritorial effect.28 These precedents 
highlight the ever-increasing declination of U.S. courts to allow the extraterritorial reach of its 
domestic laws. This limits the extent to which foreign banks that maintain offices in a forum 
state are subjected to routine requests for extraterritorial discovery. The parties will be required 
                                                          
19 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 759 (2014) 
20 Emily Flitter, ‘Gucci, Tiffany Target Chinese Banks’ Reuters (4 October 2011) 
21 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 763 (2014) 
22 Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533 (2009) 
23 Ayyash v. Kolelat, No. 151471/2012 (1st Dept. March 11, 2014) 
24 Motorola Credit Corporation v Standard Chartered Bank, No. 162 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) 
25 Motorola Credit Corporation v Standard Chartered Bank, No. 162 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) 
26 FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) 
27 Bauman v. Daimler, U.S., 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) 
28 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010); William Dodge, ‘Understanding the Presumption 
against Extraterritoriality’ (1998) 16 Berkley Journal of International Law 85, 125 
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more likely to resort to the Hague Convention when seeking discovery about accounts 
maintained abroad. In this scenario, foreign defendants will have a strong basis to challenge 
the court's assertion of jurisdiction, and resist such information discovery accordingly.  
B. The Hague Convention vs. FRCP 45 
There are two legal avenues by which the courts can compel compliance with discovery, i.e. 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 (FRCP 45) and the Hague Convention. The latter 
allows discovery that involves documents in extraterritorial actions, while the former governs 
the discovery process in actions brought before the U.S. federal courts. Given the plausible 
burden to disclose business records maintained abroad, the international community has 
developed mechanisms for obtaining overseas evidence. The standard international protocols 
are the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents 
(Hague Service Convention)29 and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad 
(Hague Evidence Convention). The Convention is the governing process by which 
transnational discovery requests are made,30 providing a legal framework for serving papers 
and obtaining evidence in cross-border disputes. The domestic law provides that a subpoena 
may “command each person to whom it is directed to produce designated documents, 
electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or 
control.” Courts may hold in contempt any person who fails to respond to a subpoena without 
adequate excuse.31 With China’s growing presence in the global marketplace for luxury goods, 
there will be a long-reaching repercussion on the application of the FRCP45. A valid nexus is 
indispensable to justify a U.S. court in applying the FRCP45. A debate arises which course is 
more viable between the Hague Convention and the FRCP 45. This study is to examine 
circumstances where the U.S. court can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to use subpoenas 
to compel a nonparty to provide documents located abroad. 
 
1. Viability of Course of Action: Procedural Justice vis-à-vis Substantive Justice  
 
In theory, the Hague Service Convention serves as the standard method for international service 
of process for U.S. litigants against China-based entities.32 Both China and the U.S. have signed 
the Hague Conventions.33 Integrating the Convention into the Chinse domestic legal system, 
its Civil Procedure Law makes it mandatory for foreign parities to collect evidence via  the 
Hague Convention. 34 In addition, the Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on Judicial 
Assistance (SPC Interpretation 2013) explicitly provides that the Hague Evidence Convention 
                                                          
29  Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,” November 1965. 
30 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (March 1970) 
31 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45(g) 
32  Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters’ (November 1965) 
33  Status Table, Hague Conference on Private International Law; The U.S. became a party to the Hague 
Convention in 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S No. 7444; China signed the Hague Convention in 1991, which 
entered into force in 1992. 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82>; The Hague Evidence Convention was 
signed by the United States in 1970 and ratified by the Senate in 1972. China acceded to the Hague Evidence 
Convention on 8 December 1997, which came into effect on 6 February 1998.  
34 Article 261 of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC 2013 provides that ‘in requesting or offering judicial 
assistance, the procedures spelled out in the international treaties signed or joined by the PRC shall be followed’. 
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is the method by which China will conduct evidence disclosure in foreign countries.35 Arguably, 
it is not viable to obtain information pursuant to a Hague Convention request in China. It is 
problematic that there has been no concrete evidence of China’s compliance with Hague 
Evidence Convention requests. On the contrary, the previous efforts have proved to be futile, 
despite the Convention’s mission to provide a transnational legal framework. In this regard, 
the procedural safeguard does not offer a viable avenue to discovery, since China interprets its 
obligations under the Convention in a way that effectively protects Chinese firms from U.S. 
litigation.36 This has resulted in many service of process and discovery requests being either 
delayed or denied. The futility of enforcement is a significant factor in contributing to an 
environment that is conducive to counterfeiting.  
 
2. A Rule of First Resort? 
 
The Hague Conference requires that first priority should be given to the Convention procedures 
regardless of whether a state regards such procedures as exclusive.37 However, the Court in 
Aerospatiale held that the slow and unreliable Hague Evidence Convention is neither the 
required first resort nor the exclusive method to obtain evidence located outside of the U.S.38 
The decision does not reduce but exacerbate current conflicts.39 Bermann argued that the court 
in Aerospatiale had failed to follow a rule of first resort to the Hague Convention for the sake 
of international comity.40 Even so, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the Aerospatiale decision that so 
long as the documents could not "easily be obtained" through alternative means, this factor 
should weigh in favour of the party seeking discovery.41 Paradoxically, the Hague Convention 
also expressly states that it is not the exclusive means to get evidence abroad.42 China’s weak 
enforcement record of Hague Convention further complicates the combat against cross-border 
counterfeiting, which compromises the legitimacy of the Convention. Southern District of New 
York has once rejected the Hague Evidence Convention as a viable means of obtaining 
documents from China.43 Given the poor compliance, the resorting to Hague Conventions 
process would be “unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce the 
needed evidence than direct use of FRCP 45”.44 As such, subpoenas could be a possible 
solution to this dilemma of jurisdiction, since Hague Conventions request does not serve as a 
                                                          
35 The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Interpretation of on Handling Requests for Judicial Assistance in Service 
of Judicial Documents, Investigation and Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Cases in Accordance with 
International Conventions and Bilateral Treaties on Judicial Assistance] (promulgated by Supreme People’s Court 
on 7 April 2013 and effective on 2 May 2013) 
36 Kevin Rosier, ‘China’s Great Legal Firewall: Extraterritoriality of Chinese Firms in the United States’ (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 May 2015) 
<http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Extraterritoriality%20of%20Chinese%20Firms_Resear
ch%20Report_0.pdf> 3 
37 Special Commission Report on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence 
Convention, (20 April 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1564) 
38 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 476 U.S. 1168 
(1986) at 543-544 
39 David Gerber, ‘International Discovery after Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework’ (1988) 82 
American Journal of International Law 521, 530 at 522 
40 George Bermann, ‘The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Aerospatiale 
Decision’ (1989) 63 Tulane Law Review 525 at 536 
41 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 937 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) 
42 Hague Evidence Convention Article 27: “...b. permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in 
this Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions; c. permitting, by internal law or practice, 
methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this Convention.” 
43 Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
44 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) at 
542 
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realistic or meaningful option. In consequence, the discretionary nature in the execution of 
Hague Convention requests creates a loophole for counterfeiters to avoid liability.45 This leaves 
U.S. courts in a state of uncertainty, which leads to cases being unpredictable.  
 
C. Uncertainty Remains-The Gucci Case 
 
An uncertain issue before the U.S. Court is to address whether the Hague Convention or the 
FRCP 45 should be used to order evidence disclosure from nonparties. Brand holders often 
seek to use New York courts as a forum to enforce judgments against those foreign entities 
aiding and abetting counterfeiting crime. Tiffany and Gucci have launched trademark 
infringement lawsuits respectively in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) against 
multiple individuals.46 The two brand holders served the Bank of China (BoC) with subpoenas 
under the FRCP 45, attempting presumably to seek evidence concerning the counterfeiting 
proceeds. The two cases illustrate contrasting decisions despite nearly the identical facts. Judge 
Pitman in Tiffany denied a motion to compel the non-party BoC to produce records from China. 
Nevertheless, Judge Sullivan in Gucci issued a different ruling requiring the bank to comply 
with a subpoena, and subsequently held the bank in contempt. The Second Circuit remanded 
the Gucci case so that the district court can address in the first instance whether there is any 
basis to exercise specific jurisdiction over the bank.  
 
1. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li 2011 
 
In June 2010, Gucci launched a trademark counterfeiting claim against owners and operators 
of a Chinese website selling counterfeit goods and transferring the illicit proceeds to accounts 
in China via the BoC.47 The plaintiff moved to compel the nonparty BoC to comply with 
subpoenas requesting the foreign discovery. The question for the court to decide is whether the 
Hague Evidence Convention is a viable alternative to a FRCP 45 subpoena. The findings would 
determine whether a New York court can order the BoC to turn over bank accounts located in 
China.  
(a) Similar Facts, Similar Arguments, Inconsistent Decisions 
In Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ customers had 
made payments through PayPal in U.S. dollars and that the illicit profits were transferred to the 
Bank of China (BoC).48 The bank asserted two arguments resisting discovery:  
“(i) the New York branches of the Bank “had no access to or control over any customer 
accounts or information located outside the U.S.”; and 
 (ii) complying with the subpoena would put the bank in legal limbo in China.”49 
After conducting a comity analysis, Judge Pitman held that the defendants have had insufficient 
contact with the state forum. He then held that discovery should proceed through the Hague 
Convention rather than the FRCP 45.50 The decision in favour of the BoC is on a plausible 
basis of the sanctions the BoC would face if it were to “disclose the requested information in 
contravention of Chinese law”.51 The plaintiff was required to bear the burden of proof to 
                                                          
45 Minning Yu, ‘Benefit of the Doubt: Obstacles to Discovery in Claims Against Chinese Counterfeiters’ (2013) 
81 (5) Fordham Law Review 2987, 3026 at 3023 
46 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 
2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
47 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
48 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 145 
49 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 146, 151 
50 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 160-161 
51 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 160 
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indicate otherwise. 52 It is apparent that Judge Pitman’s reasoning focuses on defendants’ 
interests far more than that of the plaintiff. He placed greater weight on the perceived sanctions 
notwithstanding the Restatement’s view that the factor alone is not sufficient for forgoing the 
ability to apply the FRCP45.53 Despite the dearth of evidence about the efficiency, Judge 
Pitman still refused to admit the futility of the Hague Convention. His decision is reflective of 
the Daimler’s reasoning that the BoC is neither incorporated nor a principal place in New York, 
no matter what contact it has had with the state forum. The approach goes even further than 
what international law requires in contracting the long arm of U.S. procedural statutes.54  
 
Similarly, Gucci America, Inc. (Gucci) filed a suit in August 2011 against multiple Chinese 
defendants who have sold counterfeited handbags online. The brand holder sought evidence 
from BoC’s records in relation to the transactions. The defendant asserted nearly the same 
arguments as those in Tiffany that:  
“(i) it did not have “possession, custody, or control” over the documents located in China; 
and 
(ii) compliance with the subpoena would violate Chinese law, and thus any request 
must be made under the Hague Convention.”55 
Despite the same evidence and arguments presented in Tiffany, Judge Sullivan reached an 
opposite conclusion in striking difference. Given concerns about the delay via the Hague 
Convention, he did not think the avenue as a feasible alternative to secure discovery. As 
Campbell commented:  
“the likelihood of successfully acquiring information through the Hague Evidence 
Convention is low and the process is protracted… the transmissions usually take at least 
a year. The Hague Evidence Convention is often considered practically useless as a way 
to get timely evidence discovery from China.56  
The unsurmountable delay has been exploited by counterfeiters to get a strategic advantage in 
transnational litigation. Apparently, judicial efficiency serves apparently as rationale behind 
Judge Sullivan’s reasoning, without which the goal to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
discovery may become an empty promise.57 The judge then held that BoC was subject to 
general jurisdiction in New York, and granted Gucci’s motion to compel discovery under the 
FRCP 45 subpoena.58 The decision is made due to lack of transparency regarding how China 
has handled Hague Convention requests. The Gucci decision differs from that in Tiffany in only 
two respects, i.e. different judge and diffident plaintiff, while the reasoning diverged on the 
venues to secure the documents located in China. BoC appealed, challenging the ability of the 
District Court to assert jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 158 
53 Megan Chang and Terry Chang, ‘Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties 
Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases’ (2013) 7 (2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial 
& Commercial Law 425, 441 
54 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§402-403 (1987); Gary Born and Peter 
Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (5th ed., Aspen, 2011) 595-598  
55 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
56 Ray Worthy Campbell and Ellen Claar Campbell, ‘Clash of Systems: Discovery in U.S. Litigation Involving 
Chinese Defendants’ (2016) 4 (2) Peking University Transnational Law Review 129, 175  
57 Aaron Simowitz, ‘Transactional Enforcement Discovery’ (2015) 83 (6) Fordham Law Review 3293, 3342 at 
3318 
58 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
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2. Gucci v. Bank of China, No. 11-3934 (2d Cir. 2014) 
 
The Second Circuit considered whether the District Court has jurisdiction over BoC according 
to protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 59  Personal 
jurisdiction doctrine requires a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the forum.60 It 
depends partly on the nature of BoC’s contact with New York.61 The court held that BoC’s 
mere presence of branch offices in New York does not confer jurisdiction, which is, otherwise, 
not consistent with due process constitutionally.62 The decision echoed the line of reasoning in 
the landmark case of Daimler. 63 The Second Circuit has cemented the "essentially at home” 
test into New York's jurisdictional jurisprudence.64 The Court found that BoC's contacts were 
not "so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum".65 The 
finding narrows the circumstances in which New York courts may exercise general jurisdiction 
over foreign financial institutions. The court still left open the possibility that specific personal 
jurisdiction could permit the district court to apply FRCP 45, but the Second Circuit did not 
provide clear guidance on it. It remanded the case to the district court to consider whether 
specific jurisdiction can be established. It is likely to affect a plaintiff’s ability to use the New 
York courts to gain extraterritorial discovery. 
 
3. The District Court’s Decision upon Remand  
 
The specific jurisdiction requires a sufficient nexus between a foreign nonparty’s U.S. activities 
and the discovery. There has been little precedent in this senario. Judge Sullivan took a broad 
approach to exercise his jurisdictional evaluation according to New York’s long-arm statute.66 
A statutory basis lies in FRCP 45 that allows service of a subpoena at "any place within the 
U.S.” 67 It is constitutionally proper to assert jurisdiction because the BoC has repetitively 
effectuated wire transfers for the counterfeiters in the name of its ‘Head Office in New York’.68 
The Judge concluded that his discretion comported with due process because the selection and 
repeated use of New York's banking system constitutes “purposeful availment of the privilege 
of doing business in New York”.69 In addition, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction echoes the 
International Shoe standards for due process, which articulates a “minimum contacts” test.70 
Furthermore, the decision is reflective of the reasoning embodied in Vera that foreign banks 
operating branches within the U.S. should not receive treatment different from their domestic 
counterparts, given both the foreign and domestic banks are receiving the same regulatory 
benefits.71 BoC’s New York branches should generally be subject to jurisdiction to the same 
extent as a U.S. bank. In December 2014, Gucci filed a new motion to compel production of 
BoC account information, arguing that the BoC’s New York branch has sufficient contact with 
                                                          
59 The Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the 
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property” without “due process of law.” 
60 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2798 (2011)  
61 Gucci Am. v. Bank of China,768 F.3d 122 (2d.Cir.2014) at 137-38 
62 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) at 135 
63 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014), remanded to No. 10-CV-4974 (RJS), 2015 WL 5707135 *1 
(Sept. 29, 2015); Daimler AG v. Bauman 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
64 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S., 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
65 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, 768 F.3d 122, 125-26, 145 (2d Cir. 2014) at 135 
66 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) §302(a)(1) 
67 FRCP 45(b)(2) 
68 Gucci America Inc. v. Weixing Li, Case No. 10-CV-4974 (RJS), 2015 WL 5707135 *3-6 (Sept. 29, 2015) 
69 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) 
70 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 302(a)(1); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945) 
71 Vera v. Republic of Cuba 91 F. Supp.3d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) at 571 
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its China parent for the sake of jurisdiction. Judge Sullivan imposed a fine of $75,000 plus 
$10,000 a day until the records were produced. The order would have forced the BoC’s New 
York branches to turn over information about counterfeiters’ accounts held at their headquarter 
offices in China. Accordingly, Judge Sullivan ordered the Bank to comply with the subpoenas 
on 29 September 2015, and then held BoC in contempt on 1 December 2015 for failure to 
comply. The judge imposed a daily civil contempt sanctions of $50,000 intended to coerce 
compliance. The coercive fine started on 8 December 2015, unless the BoC complied with 
subpoena requests for the records. On 20 January 2016, the BoC submitted ostensibly the 
requested documents, but dodged discovery passively. Judge Sullivan has been forced to take 
a more active role in overseeing discovery. The judicial involvement represents a promising 
sign for other brand owners seeking to enforce their IPRs against overseas counterfeiters.  
 
The decision could fill the gap left open by restricting general jurisdiction in a case where the 
U.S. has a legitimate sovereign interest.72 The court’s initiative in Gucci could park "a global 
asset hunt" in the New York court system.73 Underlying Judge Sullivan’s decision represented 
an obvious disregard of China’s secrecy law and the Hague Convention for cross-border 
discovery. Despite of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler, a non-U.S. entity may be 
subject to informational subpoenas served on its New York-based branch. The cases indicate 
the brand holders’ new tactic to tackle Chinese counterfeiters, which renders non-parties 
exposed to the full range of U.S. legal risks. It seems likely that a branch operating in New 
York may satisfy the Constitutional due process standard of ‘‘minimum contacts’’ and 
reasonableness.74 The inconsistent decisions between Tiffany and Gucci leave open the issue 
of whether the U.S. court can achieve its intended goal of recalibrating the scales on which U.S. 
courts balance foreign privacy laws with U.S. discovery requests.75 It also remains uncertain 
as to what contacts courts will deem sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction.76  
 
4. Uncertainties in jurisdiction still remain! 
 
The cases of Tiffany and Gucci highlight the continuing challenges of holding foreign financial 
institutions accountable under U.S. law.77 The inconsistency of decisions between two cases 
for how to reach Chinese nonparty banks depends largely upon the judge’s attitude towards 
China’s noncompliance record. The Second Circuit’s decision reflects the ramifications of 
Daimler in limiting general jurisdiction over foreign entities. The decision has far-reaching 
impact on the ability of U.S. courts to extract such information from Chinese banks, which 
serve as safe havens for counterfeiters in substance.78 On the one hand, the jurisdictional 
limitations impose a serious challenge for plaintiffs to rely merely on the operation of BoC’s 
New York branches for the purpose of alleging general jurisdiction.79 Greater emphasis will 
                                                          
72 Mary Twitchell, ‘The Myth of General Jurisdiction’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 610, 676  
73 Samsun Logix Corp. v Bank of China 740 F Supp 2d 484 (SD NY 2010) 
74 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); It put forth a higher threshold that a defendant’s contacts 
with a forum must be sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to render it subject to the forum’s jurisdiction, and 
assertion of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 
75 Edward Spiro and Judith Mogul, ‘Obtaining Discovery from Foreign Litigants Competing Views on Comity’ 
New York Law Journal (19 June 2012) 
76 Gucci Am., INC. v Bank of China 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) 
77 Kevin Rosier, ‘China’s Great Legal Firewall: Extraterritoriality of Chinese Firms in the United States’ (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 May 2015) 
<http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Extraterritoriality%20of%20Chinese%20Firms_Resear
ch%20Report_0.pdf> 12 
78 Erika Kinetz, ‘Bank of China ordered to release counterfeiters' records Business Insider’ (7 October 2015) 
79 Linda J. Silberman, ‘Jurisdictional Imputation in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: A Bridge Too Far’ (2013) 
66 Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc 123, 134 
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fall on the analysis of specific jurisdiction to determine whether the defendant’s contacts are 
sufficiently related to the forum.80 On the other hand, the decision on remand to the district 
court in Gucci appears to endorse Vera’s conclusion.81 However, Judge Sullivan’s subsequent 
finding of specific personal jurisdiction underscores the potential for jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants. This holds particularly true when the cause of action is tied with purposeful 
availment and rendering it fair to assert jurisdiction.82 It is also notable that  the Second Circuit 
directed the district court to consider, upon remand, whether the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the BoC would comport with principles of international comity. 
 
D. The Comity Analysis in Gucci 
The use of the doctrine to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in the 
jurisprudence of transnational litigation.83 It means that the judicial system of one country tries 
to avoid exercising jurisdiction that infringes on the laws and interests of another country.84 As 
a tenet of international law, it is “not an imperative obligation” but rather a “discretionary rule 
of practice, convenience and expediency”.85 Courts normally resort to the doctrine justifying 
how they exercise discretion on transnational cases.86 An assertion of jurisdiction should be 
reasonable in line with a general principle of competing national interests.87 Various interests 
at stake are to be balanced, including the sovereign interests and hardship of compliance, prior 
to an issuance of a subpoena over a foreign non-party. The doctrine of comity permits a court 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction out of deference to the paramount interests of another 
sovereign. 88  Nevertheless, transnational litigation may sometimes endanger international 
comity by offending foreign nations.89 The divergence between the two judges’ decisions in 
Gucci and Tiffany rests with the weight to be accorded China’s interests vis-à-vis the FRCP 
45’s judicial merits.  
 
1. The Impact of Divergent Interpretations of Comity on the Avenue’s Viability  
 
In view of a conflict of laws, the court conducted a comity analysis pursuant to Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law section 442(1)(c) to determine whether the Chinese banks 
must comply with the subpoena. The variables are briefed as seven comity factors for U.S. 
courts to consider:  
“(i)    the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other           
information requested;  
(ii)         the degree of specificity of the request;  
(iii) whether the information originated in the United States;  
                                                          
80 New York's long-arm or specific jurisdiction principle is codified in Section 302 of the New York Civil 
Procedure Law and Rules. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302. 
81 Vera v. Republic of Cuba 91 F. Supp.3d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
82 Flavio Roset, ‘Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The But for Test’ (1994) 82 (6) California Law 
Review 1545, 1594 
83 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993), whereby a ‘true conflict’ approach to comity 
analysis was adopted. 
84 Joel Paul, ‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 3-6 
85 P Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) 
86 William Dodge, ‘International Comity in American Law’ (2015) 115 (8) Columbia Law Review 2071-2141 
87 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) s403(2); ‘Constructing the State 
Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms’ (1990) 103 (6) 
Harvard Law Review 1273, 1305 
88 Pamela Bookman, ‘Litigation Isolationism’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 1081, 1144 at 1097 
89 Pamela Bookman, ‘Litigation Isolationism’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 1081, 1144 
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(iv) the availability of alternative means of securing the information, such as the Hague 
Convention;  
(v) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important 
interests of the United States, or compliance would undermine important interests 
of the state where the information is located; 
(vi) the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought; 
and  
(vii)  the good faith of the party resisting discovery.”90   
The primary variable is whether the alternative avenue is viable or not. The use of the comity 
analysis has led to inconsistent outcomes regardless of similar circumstances. According to the 
above fourth factor, both courts focus critically on whether the Chinese government would 
respect a request for discovery made under the Hague Convention.91 Judge Pitman held that 
the “availability of alternative means of retrieving the information” under factor four of the 
comity analysis favoured the Banks… Hague Convention request was not an “avenue [that] is 
futile.”92 He preserved Tiffany’s right to renew its application to enforce the subpoenas, if the 
Hague Convention proved futile. In contrast, Judge Sullivan rejected the international comity 
defence in the extraterritorial discovery after weighing the factors. He found that a comity 
analysis ‘‘strongly weighed’’ in favour of compelling compliance with the informational 
subpoena against BoC.93 
 
More significantly, the Gucci court found that the fourth factor favoured the plaintiffs, 
reasoning that a Hague Convention request would not be a “viable alternative method… and 
would leave Gucci “empty-handed” because the letters of request have “little likelihood of 
success”.94 Judge Sullivan was concerned with the potential for abuse should the court continue 
to defer to the Hague Evidence Convention and thereby impede the enforcement of IPRs.95 He 
then held that: 
“the Hague Convention would be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less 
certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules…Hague 
Convention requests in circumstances similar to those presented [in this case] are not a 
viable alternative method of securing the information plaintiffs seek.”96  
Finally, Judge Sullivan held that such requests were prone to indefinite delays to be executed.97 
He justified his decision with the other three factors taken into consideration, which relied upon 
the extent to which compliance would subvert sovereign interests of the U.S or China. It is 
China’s noncompliance record that has played a negative role in the judge’s exercise of his 
discretion. The fourth to the seventh factors constituted the integral parts of the comity analysis. 
The BoC was ordered to turn over the documents sought by plaintiffs under FRCP 45. This 
                                                          
90 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *5–12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); Tiffany 
v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151–60; Wultz v. Bank of China, No. 11-CV-1266, 298 F.R.D. 91, 96 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 
2014) 
91 Megan Chang and Terry Chang, ‘Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties 
Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases’ (2013) 7 (2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial 
& Commercial Law 425, 441 at 439 
92 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
93 Gucci America Inc. v. Weixing Li, Case No. 10-CV-4974 (RJS), 2015 WL 5707135 *1 (Sept. 29, 2015) 
94 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
95 Minning Yu, ‘Benefit of the Doubt: Obstacles to Discovery in Claims Against Chinese Counterfeiters’ (2013) 
81 (5) Fordham Law Review 2987, 3026 at 3023  
96 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2014); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 
6156936 at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
97 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *23-26 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) 
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demonstrates a different interpretation of “the availability of alternative means”, against which 
Judge Sullivan did not read it to be actually viable or likely to succeed.98  
 
2. The Balancing Test of Competing National Interests 
 
The balancing test attempts to avoid an inevitable overlap of multiple sovereignty claiming 
jurisdiction over litigation parties.99 Each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as 
the other state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction and should defer to another state with greater 
interest.100 China’s interests stand at cross-purposes to U.S. sovereign interests in ensuring its 
substantive law to apply.101 Weighing which nation has more “important interests” on the 
judiciary, there has been an alleged conflict of law between Chinese banking laws and an FRCP 
45. It all comes down to a 'Hobson's choice', that is, the prioritisation of one sovereign to the 
detriment of the legal system of another one.102 As a commentator observed:  
“the Tiffany v. Qi court deferred to Chinese sovereignty over U.S. sovereignty, while 
Gucci’s deference to U.S. discovery rules infringed China’s sovereign interests in 
protecting its depositors’ confidential information.”103 
The court attempts to respect more significant interest and accordingly defer to another 
sovereign law. The Gucci court’s disregard for Chinese State Secrecy law in favour of U.S. 
discovery rules, whereas Judge Pitman did not intend to infringe on Chinese sovereignty unless 
the process via a Hague Convention request proved to be futile.104 Spiro and Mogul pointed 
out an inherent flaw in interest-balancing framework due to excessive discretion in nature.105 
The requirement that the conduct prejudices the state’s most vital interests makes this basis of 
jurisdiction narrow.106 It remains controversial whether it will produce a meaningful result 
through the lens of the national interest. Arguably, a proclamation by judicial fiat that one 
interest is less important than the other will not erase a real conflict.107  
 
Merely avoiding extraterritorial discovery per se does not necessarily preserve the U.S. 
sovereign interests.108 A refusal to actively tackle transnational counterfeiting may seriously 
damage the credibility of the U.S. commitment to protect the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
                                                          
98 Megan Chang and Terry Chang, ‘Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties 
towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases’ (2013) 7 (2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & 
Commercial Law 425, 441 at 435 
99 David Noll, ‘The New Conflicts Law’ (2014) 2 (1) Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation 40, 96 
100 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States s 402 (1987) s 403(3) 
101 Pamela Bookman, ‘Litigation Isolationism’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 1081, 1144 at 1135  
102 American Bar Association Resolution 103 (2012); Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘ABA Seeks to Avoid ‘Hobson’s 
Choice’ in International Discovery’ ABA Journal (6 February 2012) 
103 Megan Chang and Terry Chang, ‘Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties 
Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases’ (2013) 7 (2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & 
Commercial Law 425, 441 at 436 
104 Megan Chang and Terry Chang, ‘Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties 
Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases’ (2013) 7 (2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial 
& Commercial Law 425, 441 at 435 
105 Edward Spiro and Judith Mogul, ‘Obtaining Discovery from Foreign Litigants Competing Views on Comity’ 
New York Law Journal (19 June 2012) 
106 ‘Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ 
<http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Task%20Force%20on%20Extraterritorial%20Jurisdiction%20
-%20Report%20.pdf 111> 14 
107 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984)  
108 Hannah Buxbaum, ‘Assessing Sovereign Interests in Cross-Border Discovery Disputes: Lessons from 
Aerospatiale’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 87, 101 
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at a macro level, which has negative ramifications for the U.S. interests.109 The Tiffany case 
serves as a perfect example, whereas China’s interest was decided seemingly to outweigh the 
U.S.’s interest in enforcing IPRs. However, the Chinese secrecy laws’ prohibition does not 
necessarily justify incompliance with a U.S. court subpoena.110 After all, judicial efficiency 
represents another vital prong embodied in a court’s discretion. With such a goal compromised, 
the value that the international community purports to advance would be undermined. In this 
vein, Judge Pitman’s decision is inconsistent with the overriding interest in the ‘just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination’ of litigation in the court,111 whereas it represents the exact 
primary goal in respect of New York’s interests in adjudicating the transnational counterfeiting 
dispute. The Supreme Court in Daimler emphasised the interests of the forum State in 
narrowing jurisdiction.112 However, it is not required to adhere blindly to foreign directives,113 
provided that the U.S. court demonstrates due respect to foreign sovereign interest. In addition, 
the BoC did resort to plausible civil and criminal liability it could face unless the request was 
enforced through the Hague Convention. The threat of sanctions per se does not constitute a 
valid basis to withhold discovery. 
 
E. China’s Legal Firewall: Sovereignty and State Secrecy Law 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is inherently linked to notions of national sovereignty.114 However, 
a conventional sovereignty-based approach is no longer effective against transnational 
counterfeiting. It is further complicated with the predominantly conventional doctrine of 
sovereignty in the way to securing overseas discovery. The BoC contemplates to use China’s 
State Secrecy Law to shield it from the U.S. jurisdiction, while the U.S. litigants resort to the 
extraterritorial application of domestic law. China has built a legal firewall to shield its 
financial services firms from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Ostensibly, complying with the 
U.S. subpoenas means to violate Chinese Secrecy Law and subject them to sanctions. It is wrongly 
conceived that the need to comply with State Secrecy Laws plausibly makes the BoC immune 
to U.S. jurisdiction.115  However, the aggravate sovereign tensions result in China’s secrecy 
laws being far narrower than the discovery systems of the U.S.116 The brand holders suffer 
from both institutional void and insufficient international cooperation due to the sensible 
sovereign concerns. As such, bank secrecy within the intelligence sharing for tackling 
counterfeiting will require delicate balancing to ensure the maintaining of sovereignty on the 
one hand and to avoid the abuse by the transnational counterfeiters on the other.117 In response 
                                                          
109 Paul Scott, ‘Extraterritorial Discovery and the Hague Evidence Convention after Socijtd Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale: An American Interests Approach to Comity’ (1988) 13 Yale Journal of International Law 366, 387 
110 Geoffrey San, ‘Court-Ordered Law Breaking: U.S. Courts Increasingly Order the Violation of Foreign Law’  
(2015) 81 (1) Brooklyn Law Review 181, 238 
111 FRCP s1.; Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 
544 (1987) at 542–43; Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012); Trevor Hartley, 
International Commercial Litigation: Text, Cases and Materials on Private International Law § 5 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) 554 
112 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) 
113 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 482 U.S. 
522 (1987) at 544 
114 ‘Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational 
Norms’ (1990) 103 (6) Harvard Law Review 1273, 1305 at 1278 
115 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (State Secrecy Law) was revised on 29 
April 2010 and came into effect on 1 October 2010. 
116Aaron Simowitz, ‘Transactional Enforcement Discovery’ (2015) 83 (6) Fordham Law Review 3293, 3342 at 
3322 
117 Maggie Gardner, ‘Channeling Unilateralism’ (2015) 56 (2) Harvard International Law Journal 297, 351 
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to the growing transgressions, some nominal sacrifices of sovereignty may help to make 
transnational anti-counterfeiting laws more effective.118 
 
1. Sovereignty and State Secrecy Law vis-à-vis the FRCP 45  
Sovereignty is the sine qua non of statehood, affirming the state’s exclusive procession of 
jurisdiction within its border. 119 The territoriality principle is the most common basis of 
jurisdictional jurisprudence and is widely regarded as a manifestation of the classical 
sovereignty.120 A recourse is normally made to the notion of state sovereignty to address 
jurisdictional concerns. One state should not encroach upon the sovereignty of any other 
state. 121  The Chinese government regards discovery within China as a violation of its 
sovereignty because it is conceived that fact gathering is the responsibility of Chinese judges. 
The BoC argued that to maintain client privacy is considered as a matter of national sovereignty. 
Such a plausible explanation of sovereignty provides sanctuary to those counterfeiting 
makers. 122  The current prevailing paradox impedes the international community to 
countenance extraterritoriality, even at the price of sacrificing legitimacy of sovereignty to 
retain ostensible sovereignty. 123  The conventional sovereign jurisdiction seems unable to 
provide meaningful avenue to control transnational counterfeiting. As such, the crux of an 
argument is which law prevails over another between the FRCP 45 and China’s Secrecy Law. 
 
(a) New Challenges on Sovereignty in the New Era  
 
There are high national interests to protect IPRs as China steers toward an innovation-oriented 
economy. The prevalent counterfeiting is harmful to China’s indigenous innovation, which is 
harmful for the country’s long-term strategy of global competitiveness. China is particularly 
sensitive to any plausible disrespect for its sovereignty, even though the cross-border 
counterfeiting crime breaches its own statutes. Under such a judicial and political context, the 
BoC used sovereignty as a defensive measure and argued that the discovery would be an affront 
to China's sovereignty. Paradoxically, the sovereign immunity could prohibit courts in the U.S. 
from exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that commits a tort outside the 
U.S. 124  However, the U.S. extraterritorial discovery requests does not necessarily offend 
foreign judicial sovereignty,125 not to mention that the new cyberage leads to the increasing 
erosion of sovereignty.126 
                                                          
118 Ernesto Savona and Phil Williams (eds.) The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime (Routledge, 
2012) 80-107 
119 John Jackson, ‘Sovereignty - Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97 American Journal 
of International Law 782, 802; Harold Maier, ‘Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts or “There and Back Again”’ 
(1984) 25 Virginia Journal of International Law 7, 18   
120 Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 56 
121 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) s402(3) 
122 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Threat of Transnational Organised Crime 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/1.The-threat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf> 
123 Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Organized Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering’ in P. J Simmons and    
Chantel Ouderen, Challenges in International Governance (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 2001) 106-150 
at 144 
124 ‘Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ 
<http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Task%20Force%20on%20Extraterritorial%20Jurisdiction%20
-%20Report%20.pdf 111> 
125 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale  v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) 
at 557-558 
126 Eric Ip, ‘Globalization and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State’ (2010) 8 (3) International Journal of 
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The transnational counterfeiting crime has taken a new shape, being more invisible in an 
unconventional manner. Counterfeiters have appropriated new cyber technologies that makes 
it difficult for their crime to be traced. The cybercrime not only complicates the sovereignty 
issue, but also enables counterfeiters to exploit national sovereignty. The internet-based 
counterfeiting demands timely enforcement responses. However, jurisprudence lags 
considerably behind the meteoric growth of the online counterfeiting. There is strong rationale 
to go beyond conventional notions of sovereignty when they only benefit counterfeiters. Since 
new intelligent-style crimes cross borders, the solutions to these global challenges are to be 
addressed beyond sovereignty. 127 In certain circumstances, the concept of secrecy should 
diminish accordingly. The challenge would be resolved if the Chinese government could entail 
procedural flexibility to combat transnational counterfeiting. As to a commentator, states may 
fill the void of this inaction by taking positive action to prevent further crime where other 
sovereigns does not act appropriately.128 
 
The extraterritorial discovery may have the effect of limiting sovereignty, behind which one of 
the rationales is manifested in the futility of seeking discovery via the Hague Convention. 
Another one rests with China’s undue protection of its sovereignty, which is not compatible 
with its Hague Conventions obligations. BoC may resort to the authority endorsed in Daimler 
that shares many aspects in common with that of the Gucci case.129 However, the decision 
should not be read so broadly as to eliminate the necessary regulatory oversight into BoC’s 
operation of its New York branches.130 The BoC has virtually lost its legitimacy when hiding 
accounting information of those counterfeiters. The essence of sovereignty is thus 
systematically undermined by the cross-border crime. As Guymon pointed out dialectically, 
what is given up in achieving the cooperation will be potentially regained if the threat is 
mitigated, since sovereignty is being eroded by transnational counterfeiting.131 In this vein, 
sovereigns need limitation in certain circumstances. The traditional sovereign methods are 
inadequate to deal with the international dimension of the threats. It is advocated that a 
sovereign state be committed to prioritise extraterritorial discovery response over sovereignty 
concern under the framework of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC).132 In response to the new challenges, it is essential to reconceptualise the traditional 
approaches. Foreign sovereignty should evolve attitude toward the increasingly complicated 
cross-border counterfeiting. The novelty via relinquishing certain rigid sovereign formalities is 
conducive to nullifying the advantage that counterfeiters have derived from the loopholes of 
insufficient anti-counterfeiting systems. 
 
(b) The Defence based on Banking and State Secrecy Laws 
 
State secrets are matters that have a vital bearing on national interests. Among other things, the 
recourse to the Chinese State Secrecy Law could exempt the bank from turning over evidence. 
The Law of the PRC on Guarding State Secrets (State Secrecy Law) restricts transfer of certain 
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data that includes those state-owned banks, like the BoC.133 State Secrecy Law prevents data 
from being disclosed from China to any foreign institutions if it is deemed to contain a state 
secret.134 It is defined ranging from:  
“(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on State affairs to the potentially all-
encompassing; 
…... 
(4) secrets in national economic and social development.”135  
The law does not define what constitutes a state secret, so the Chinese government interprets it 
broadly. Almost all of financial information was classified as a state secret and could not be 
disclosed.136 Article 26 provides that cross-border transfer of any document considered a state 
secret is not permitted without approval of competent departments.137 The penalty for violating 
this provision can be severe. In financial institutions, a person shall be sentenced up to three 
years for disclosing an account holder’s information.138 Under Article 111 of the PRC Criminal 
Law, illegally providing state secrets to an organisation outside of China is punishable by five 
years to even life in prison.139 With regard to the Gucci case, State Secrecy Law shields the 
BoC from producing account information and freezing counterfeiters’ accounts in China. 
Furthermore, bank secrecy laws prohibit the disclosure of customer account information 
without consent. In 2011, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) issued a Notice to Urge Banking 
Financial Institutions to Protect Personal Financial Information, under which Chinese banks 
are prohibited from providing personal financial information to an offshore entity.140 In 2013, 
the Chinese government issued the Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of 
Telecommunications and Internet Users (MIIT Provisions 2013).141 The ministerial regulation  
prohibits the transfer of personal data abroad without express consent of the data subject or 
explicit regulatory approval. 142  Despite being a voluntary guidance in nature, the MIIT 
Provisions 2013 serves as a regulatory baseline for Chinese judicial authorities.    
 
Foreign restrictions on discovery does embody many policy values. There is no doubt that 
China has a material interest for the sake of fostering its banking system.143 As a double-edge 
sword, potential counterfeiters can exploit the sophisticated safeguarding mechanism, who 
engage in infringement of IPRs but escape from liabilities. The laws have been virtually 
susceptible to exploitation by international counterfeiters. In this sense, the legal firewall has 
made Chinese banks serve as safe havens for counterfeiters, who use them illegally to complete their 
illicit capital flow online s as well as transactions. There is no wonder why the BoC is frequently 
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exploited by counterfeiters to move their ill-gotten gains beyond the reach of the U.S. law 
enforcement.144 It renders great challenges for investigators to trace the flow of illicit profits in 
the sophisticated Chinese legal system. In response, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: 
“a foreign law which purports to prohibit disclosure does not “deprive an American 
court of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even 
though the act of production may violate that statute.”145 
By a narrow margin, however, the decision split five to four.  As Slaughter observed, this paves 
the way to balancing the merits of resort to the Hague Convention on a case-by-case basis, 
unless an overriding interest dictates otherwise.146 The approach is consistent with the above 
proposition that to assert jurisdiction be through a critical comity analysis.    
In Gucci case, Judge Sullivan was concerned with the BoC exploiting Chinese secrecy laws as 
a “shield against the subpoenas and the possibility of counterfeiters utilising foreign secrecy 
laws to “facilitate global infringement schemes”.147 The BoC’s refusal to comply with the 
subpoena could deprive plaintiffs of thier judicial remedy in litigation. The BoC’s litigation 
strategy is to use the legal firewall to avoid disclosure upon requests from the U.S. courts. This 
renders it vulnerable for plaintiffs when they file grievances against counterfeiters. Even if 
Gucci ultimately secured discovery from the BoC, it is likely to hit a legal firewall when it tried 
to collect damages. In this regard, allowing foreign banks to evade discovery would, in 
substance, authorise them to be in facilitation of counterfeiting.  
(c) The Equitable Interest for the U.S. Sovereign  
 
The court may resort to reasonableness prong of the Restatement and consider avoiding 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.148 Among the factors 
considered by a court assessing the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction are:  
      “(i)          the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the [entity]”; 
       (ii)         the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case;  
(iii)  the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;  
(iv) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
the controversy; and  
(v) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.”149 
In accordance with the second factor, the U.S. substantive law applies to advance its significant 
sovereign interests, which includes having its courts resolve lawsuits involving U.S. sovereign 
interests. A U.S. court has a vital interest in not only providing a forum, but also enforcing the 
judgments.150 With the Hague Convention a perceived nullity, a judge may need to respect 
another sovereign’s interests. This rationale justifies partly the decision in Gucci that the U.S.’s 
interest in protecting its IPRs trumped China’s interest in protecting bank secrets under an 
FRCP 45 subpoena.  
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First, jurisdiction could be inferred under the New York Banking Law §200 with the vital 
sovereign interests balanced.151 The U.S. has a substantial interest in vindicating the rights of 
the U.S. plaintiffs.152 Hardly could China be justified to have a legitimate sovereign interest in 
impeding a discovery process of this kind. Resort to the Chinese State Secrecy Law makes little 
sense but nullify the application of the U.S.’s substantive laws.153 The application of the 
Chinese Secrecy Law is too uncertain to equalise the status of U.S. domestic and Chinese 
financial institutions. Judge Pitman’s reluctance to extraterritoriality could put U.S. plaintiffs 
in a more disadvantaged position than foreign defendants. Apparently, the U.S. discovery is 
generally broader than that permitted under the Chinese law.154 The former may suffer from a 
gap resulting from its broader pretrial discovery.155 It would give BoC preferential treatment 
to that afforded domestic banks.156  
 
Second, U.S. domestic companies remain subject to personal jurisdiction, while foreign ones 
gain largely immunity. An uneven playing field has come into being, that is, a U.S. domestic 
company is subject to personal jurisdiction, whereas its Chinese counterpart need not be.157 
The resulting regime virtually discriminates against those domestic companies, since the 
narrowing scope of personal jurisdiction limits the U.S. plaintiffs’ ability to access to the U.S. 
courts for extraterritorial discovery. 158  The BoC operates in New York, while shielding 
transnational counterfeiting crime by its China branches. It cannot be equitably justified to give 
advantage to the BoC with a branch in New York over a domestic bank.159 The excessive 
endorsement to Daimler would result in the abuse by the counterfeiters against the U.S. 
financial system. In consequence, the Second Circuit’s decision enables, in substance, the BoC 
to hide information concerning counterfeiters’ accounting information. In general, laws of the 
state in which a court is located can provide the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.160 
Foreign financial institutions should be, at least, bound by the same judicial constraints as 
domestic ones.161 As such, an innovative response should be adjusted to address the new 
challenges caused by the transnational counterfeiting. Strategically, the BoC must consider 
how its operations are structured to minimise the risk of being subject to general jurisdiction in 
the U.S. Otherwise, it should be subject to jurisdiction to the same extent as a domestic bank 
based in New York from an equitable perspective. 
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2. Between a Rock and a Hard Place? 
 
A non-party bank cannot function effectively if it is subject to conflicting legal systems.162 The 
claiming of jurisdiction by more than one state renders it seemingly a catch-22 situation.163 The 
BoC remains plausibly at risk of a court finding jurisdiction in both the U.S. and China. The 
plaintiff’s litigation strategy could make the bank find itself caught between the Chinese 
Secrecy Law and discovery subpoenas animating the FRCP 45. It faced a plausible dilemma 
between a rock and a hard place, that is, either violating the U.S. law on the one hand, or 
disregarding China’s Secrecy Law on the other. Under such a conflicting legal scenario, a bank 
has to balance its competing legal obligations to more than one jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
Judge Sullivan was not convinced that the BoC would suffer real sanctions in China. It is worth 
examining whether the Gucci case could fall genuinely within such a circle based on the 
arguments of public policy.  
 
(a) Intangible Privilege and Reciprocal Obligation to Comply  
 
Weak legal governance makes the Chinese firms less competitive globally.164 It is the rigorous 
enforcement of law and regulation that enhance regulatory standard race to the top. The 
invisible leverage adjusts the governance level to improve dramatically. Through exposure to 
the U.S. capital markets and legal standards, Chinese banks’ increased presence in the U.S. has 
positive spillover effects on corporate governance and rule of law in China. Exposure to the 
U.S. regulators creates a positive feedback loop back into China, pushing the government to 
realise that its own legal system is diminishing the chances for Chinese multinational 
companies (MNCs) to successfully compete overseas. 165 It is a more established judicial 
system that provides their competitors a greater arsenal of legal options in the case of improper 
behaviour.166 In this regard, the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over Chinese firms would indirectly 
improve the rule of law in China. This even serves as a form of regulatory competition to drive 
the Chinese government to enhance its own regulation.167 Rosen and Hanemann are optimistic 
with the positive spillover effects on the behavior of Chinese firms and rule of law in China.168 
Such an effect has been well-manifested at both macro and micro levels. In respect of the 
legislative and institutional building, China has passed laws to guard against the international 
flow of counterfeit goods in 1995.169 The Chinese Trademark Law was amended in 2013 and 
                                                          
162 Sarah Reid and Marietta Jo, ‘The Second Circuit’s Recent Comity Decision in Gucci: Help for Non-Party 
Banks Caught in the Argentina Bond Dispute?’ (2015) 3 The Banking Law Journal 139, 146 
163 Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012) 
164 Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, ‘The Rise of Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means for 
American Businesses’ China Business Review (1 July 2012) 
165 Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, ‘The Rise of Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means for 
American Businesses’ China Business Review (1 July 2012) 
166 Kevin Rosier, ‘China’s Great Legal Firewall: Extraterritoriality of Chinese Firms in the United States’ (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 May 2015) 
<http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Extraterritoriality%20of%20Chinese%20Firms_Resear
ch%20Report_0.pdf> 3 
167 John Coffee, ‘Racing towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on 
International Corporate Governance’ (2002) 102 (7) Columbia Law Review 1757, 1831 
168 Kevin Rosier, ‘China’s Great Legal Firewall: Extraterritoriality of Chinese Firms in the United States’ (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 May 2015) 
<http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Extraterritoriality%20of%20Chinese%20Firms_Resear
ch%20Report_0.pdf>; Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, ‘The Rise of Chinese Overseas Investment and What 
It Means for American Businesses’ China Business Review (1 July 2012) 
169 David Volodzko, ‘‘China's Addiction to Counterfeiting’ The Diplomat (17 October 2015) 
21 
 
came into effect on 1 May 2014.170 It introduced severe punishments for repeated infringements 
and raised the amount of statutory damages from ¥RMB500, 000 (£51,501) to ¥RMB 3 million 
(£300,000). 171 Sophisticated institutions have also been established to ensure effective 
enforcement, including intellectual property courts and a State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO).172 
 
Furthermore, the prestige and credibility in the New York capital market is perceived to 
increase a company's intangible value in the eyes of the public.173 Operating in New York 
enables the BoC to gain substantial intangible value as well as the bonding effect.174 The 
shocking therapy facilitates the BoC to become globally competitive partly because of the 
adjustment required to comply with U.S. governance principles. The bank is increasingly 
benefiting from U.S. financial markets, which presence in the more credible market crystallises 
the raising of capital. Within a more established legal and regulatory framework, the BoC is 
expected to mitigate its weak governance regime by bonding to the better disclosure and higher 
standards. It also signals to the market that the bank is in a position to comply with higher 
governance standards than those operating in China. Doty endorses the positive perspective in 
global governance that:  
“The bonding effect- that is, the commitment to abide by the standards and 
laws …rewards companies located in markets without developed investor protection 
regimes.”175 
The BoC gains privileges from operating a branch in New York, which gives rise to 
commensurate and reciprocal obligations.176 The BoC earns a documented “New York Branch” 
premium for bonding itself to U.S. institutions and committing to U.S. compliance. This 
ostensibly sends a message that the bank should abide by an international standard laws and 
governance regulations of its host state. The BoC availing itself of bonding effect in New York 
must abide by its laws, although, this approach will be resorted to only in those transnational 
crimes, such as the cross-border counterfeiting. Accordingly, the BoC has an obligation to 
provide assistance against the transnational counterfeiting crime.  
(b) Does the scenario of “between a rock and a hard place” genuinely exist? 
As analysed above, the bank argued that it would have faced legal and regulatory repercussions 
in China had it been forced to comply with the subpoena. Otherwise, the failure to comply 
could risk being held in contempt by the U.S court. First, it remains highly controversial as to 
whether a foreign law prohibition on disclosure serves as an absolute bar to extraterritorial 
discovery. The Supreme Court in Rogers held that “the procedural laws of the U.S., as well as 
the substantive laws, may not be relaxed upon its courts because of difficulties a party may 
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have with a different sovereign power.”177 The Chinese State Secrecy Law aims solely to 
preclude evidence gathering, as opposed to protecting a specific type of information.178 It 
appears to be bound by conflicting systems of law, which is seemingly hypothetical. The BoC 
operating in New York is required to comply with its financial laws and regulations.  Prior to 
any cross-border registration, a bank normally weighs the costs and benefit of being subject to 
more sophisticated laws and regulations in a host state. Doing business in jurisdiction subjects 
one to its laws.179 It is a cost for a firm to subject itself to higher-standard law and regulations, 
which inevitably renders it exposed more likely to liabilities. The bank has tactically used 
conflict of laws as a defence that it need to comply with Chinese secrecy laws, attempting to 
be immune to U.S. jurisdiction. BoC argued that it could not submit documents without running 
afoul of China’s strict privacy laws.180 However, having availed itself of the privileges of doing 
business in New York, the bank could hardly hide behind Chinese Secrecy Laws as a shield. 
This is particularly true where the bank secrecy laws at issue have been used to facilitate serious 
violations of U.S. law.”181 
 
Second, the relationship of the BoC with the Chinese government represents another key 
element in the court’s discretion. 182 Hardship is always taken into account when a court 
determines whether to issue discovery orders. One of the grounds to which the BoC referred 
and thereby resisted the subpoena is that extraterritorial discovery was at odds with the Chinse 
law, which may subject it to criminal sanctions. Hardly is the sanction credible when the 
Chinese government possesses major ownership interests, that is, around 67% of the A shares 
in BoC,183 which renders the hardship of compliance unlikely. In respect of the plausible 
conflicting legal obligation, the court examines the existence of any real repercussion BoC 
would face for breaching Chinese secrecy laws. This finding has been supported given the 
absence of a single instance of sanctions against the BoC since the first time it raised the 
argument in 2011.184 Thus, the risk of consequences to the bank seems too speculative to 
demonstrate hardship arising from the subpoena compliance.185 It is unlikely that a U.S. court 
will recognise a credible threat of punishment to Chinese banks in future cases, unless the 
Chinese government begins to impose civil or criminal penalties for a breach of the secrecy 
laws.186 In this scenario, Judge Sullivan’s decision to refute the BoC’s defence is justified 
properly.  
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F. Reassess the Extraterritorial Liability Risks in Global Governance 
 
Some jurisdictions either lack the capability or the political will to combat the transnational 
crime due diligence. A lack of international integration allows counterfeiters to conduct 
counterfeiting across borders. The loopholes arising from a lack of legal cooperation enable 
counterfeiters to use BoC as financial shelters. The recent cases have significantly altered the 
landscape with respect to enforcement of U.S. subpoenas on branch offices of non-U.S. 
corporations. It is worth examining a variety of variables at stake in respect of the mitigating 
measures. The perceived discovery inefficiencies render it harder for litigants to secure 
extraterritorial discovery. 187  A most controversial debate is about the feasibility to 
institutionalise “consent via registration. It is also notable that the regulatory cooperation serves 
as an indispensable solution to issues related to the cross-border counterfeiting. 
 
1. The Functional Jurisdictional Theory vis-à-vis The Executive Role 
The unilateral judicial interfere with foreign affairs could result in some unintended 
repercussion, including international discord and even frictions.188A functionalist jurisdictional 
regime could work better in view of the severity of transnational counterfeiting crime.189 The 
fact that transnational counterfeiters have deliberately utilised BoC to thwart the reach of the 
Lanham Act justifies the theoretic approach. Ostensibly, courts may not be well equipped to 
evaluate potential foreign relations inquiries, while executive authorities could involve in 
resolving the conflict, since they are better suited than judiciary at addressing foreign 
relations.190 
 
(a) Ideological Gap and the Resultant Unilateralism  
 
Traditional approaches generally tend to neglect the variability of ideological influence in 
addressing cross-border disputes between the U.S. and China.  An inherent conflict in ideology 
is normally manifested at a macro level. The disputes in Gucci is part of a larger conflict 
between China's opaque, state-dominated economic system and the disclosure-based U.S. 
regulatory regime. 191 Accordingly, institutional conflicts are embodied in the two divergent 
primary systems, i.e. the U.S. free market and China’s state capitalism, which gives rise to deep 
distrust between the two authorities.192 The ideological differences limit the two jurisdictions 
to combat cross-border counterfeiting more efficiently. The lack of efficacy in applying the 
Hague Convention widens the perceived ideological gap. As a result, the unilateralism prevails 
over resolutions via constructive dialogues.193 Ideologically, the Chinese government always 
envisages that regulatory cooperation could impinge upon China’s national sovereignty and 
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risk disclosure of state secrets. 194  There is a dubious concern that to submit the BoC’s 
documents would open the way for the imperialistic imposition of the U.S. norms in China.195 
In a micro-operation mechanism, the Chinese government may need to be more compliant with 
the discovery under the Hague Convention. In striking a balance, China should comply with 
Hague Convention more effectively while maintaining authority in its State Secrecy Laws. The 
credit building of its performance reputation takes time. In the longer run, the compliance is 
conducive to simplifying such kind of clashes originating from the extraterritorial discovery.  
 
(b) Judicial Role vis-à-vis Executive Role  
 
Transnational litigation can impact foreign affairs and even trigger foreign relations 
concerns.196 In accordance with the functional jurisdictional theory, Judge Sullivan’s decision 
can likely stimulate the inefficient discovery system. It also provoked the Chinese government, 
which threatened the stability of bilateral relations with the U.S. because of discovery 
requests.197 Notwithstanding, expansive concepts of general jurisdiction over foreigners can 
impose barriers to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) that may conflict with executive 
branch policies.198 The court’s expansive assertion of jurisdiction may impede the executive 
branches’ approaches in terms of reciprocal agreements. Arguably, cases that embroider 
sensitive foreign affairs could best be addressed by the executive branches. In the Tiffany case, 
the court seemed to prevent themselves from interfering with executive branch prerogatives.199 
In contrast, Judge Sullivan’s decision in Gucci not to resort to the Hague Convention has led 
to the Chinese official concerns. Tension becomes even more acute when state owned entities 
(SOEs), like the BoC, are involved.200 Given the executive branch’s dominant role in foreign 
relations, the court may need to interfere minimally with the executive branches’ foreign 
relations prerogatives.201 It could be argued that courts are “generally not the proper bodies to 
weigh which sovereign’s interests are more meritorious”, 202  given potential profound 
repercussions on foreign relations. The Supreme Court has justified the anti-extraterritoriality 
presumption as a way of preventing judicial interference with the “delicate field of international 
relations.”203 The U.S. courts would accordingly exercise their jurisdiction in consistence with 
principle of comity. The approach is conducive to keeping courts from unnecessarily 
interfering foreign affairs.204 The executive branches’ involvement, particularly in dealing with 
China, could facilitate the efficacy of China’s commitment to using the Hague Convention. 
The ideal outcome would alleviate the plausible sanctions imposed on BoC by reason of 
compliance with the Subpoena. Such a goal will not be achieved in the short term. By no means 
should the plaintiffs’ legitimate interests be deferred until the paradoxical goal comes true. 
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2. The Paradoxical Notion of Consent by Registration   
 
A consent-by-registration theory is based on a company’s compliance with state registration 
statutes, which would potentially circumvent the minimum contacts test established by 
International Shoe.205 It is uncertain as to whether the highly-split approaches of the consent-
based registration is considered due diligence or not. Foreign banks may be required to comply 
with U.S. subpoenas as a prerequisite for doing business in the near future. They could be 
supposed to assign an agent for service of process in the U.S. consent to jurisdiction, given 
their home states cannot adequately implement the Hague Convention.206 Such a notion was 
endorsed by Smith that if a party conducts business in a territory, that choice equates to 
consenting to be governed by the territory’s laws.207 It remains to be seen whether the U.S. 
authority could secure the discovery by requesting compliance consent of foreign financial 
institutions to accept the extraterritorial jurisdiction when creating their U.S. branches. 
 
(a) The Statutory Approach  
 
Hypothetically, BoC’s registration with the New York Department of Financial Services is 
deemed to have consented to serve of a claim arising out of a transaction with its New York 
branches.208 Following such a reasoning, does it mean that a court can require BoC, which has 
filed a registration in New York, to thereby consent to turn over documents even located in 
China? New York’s consent-based general jurisdiction proposal has not been passed yet 
although it was introduced for a second time on 30 March 2015.209 As Epstein observed: “a 
privilege cannot be granted subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or 
‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional right.”210 Another commentator recently observed  that 
the theory contradicts the due process criteria required for general jurisdiction, that is, 
ascertainability and uniqueness.211 The analysis illustrates the constitutional inadequacy of 
consent-by-registration to general jurisdiction. Otherwise, a foreign company would forfeit its 
due process protection from all-purpose jurisdiction in advance.212 Furthermore, neither the 
European Union (EU)’s Brussels Regulation,213 nor the UK’s law supports general jurisdiction 
based on the theory of implied consent by registration.214 The discord between the procedural 
regimes of the U.S. and those of other jurisdictions would cause compliance asymmetry in 
terms of international comity.215 
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(b) Challenges in Common Law Precedents  
 
The "registration" theory of general jurisdiction is embodied in the 1917 case of Pennsylvania 
Fire. 216 A foreign entity can incur consent to jurisdiction by operation of law, based on 
invoking the benefit and protection of the forum state’s legal system.217 The recent cases may 
hasten a new requirement that a party impliedly consents to obey U.S. law when opening 
business within the U.S. A plausible conflict between New York’s statutory jurisdictions and 
“at home” test created by Daimler has yet to be resolved. The Supreme Court in Daimler seems 
to have invalidated the consent-by-registration theory. However, it did not address how its more 
stringent due process requirements affect jurisdiction by consent. It remains uncertain whether 
consent-by-jurisdiction satisfies due process in circumstances where foreign companies are not 
“at home” articulated by Daimler.218  
 
The case law has not yet come fully to grips with potential limitations on general jurisdiction 
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Daimler. There continues to be 
substantial divergences upon whether consent-by-registration is insufficient to establish 
general jurisdiction post-Daimler. Every assertion of jurisdiction must meet the requirements 
of constitutional due process.219 Several courts have answered that general jurisdiction upon 
consent does not violate due process, holding that Daimler applies only to foreign entities that 
have not consented to suit in the forum.220 Some courts have followed the Daimler precedent, 
holding that registering to do business per se is insufficient to establish jurisdiction post-
Daimler. For instance, the Vera court addressed the scope of a foreign bank’s consent to 
jurisdiction in an expansive manner.221 Its ‘consent’ analysis has initiated the debate, but yet 
to clarify the issue.222 The court just held that a foreign bank was subject to jurisdiction 
requiring it to comply with information subpoenas because it registered with and obtained a 
license from the Department of Financial Services, and appointed an agent for in-state service 
of process.223 The U.S. Supreme Court in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell strongly reaffirmed the 
Daimler rule on 30 May 2017. 224  It still left open the question whether corporation’s 
registration to do business in a state can constitute consent to general jurisdiction, which is 
bound to be the focus of vigorous debate  in future cases.  
 
The Second Circuit in Gucci held that compliance with state registration statutes is “insufficient 
to confer general jurisdiction in a state that is neither its state of incorporation nor its principal 
place of business”.225 It is worth noting  that Justice Ginsburg’s reference in Daimler provides 
invaluable insight into consent-by-registration as a theory of jurisdiction and suggests avenues 
of future research into how compliance with corporate registration statutes affects specific 
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jurisdiction.226 It remains to be seen whether a mere regulatory filing in New York should 
constitute consent to jurisdiction for all purposes. It all comes down to a fundamental issue, 
that is, whether consent-by-registration satisfies due process based on a theory outside 
Daimler’s “at home” test. 
 
3. The Incentives of Cooperation and Potentials 
 
Transnational counterfeiting presents the international community with particularly 
challenging task. Efficient combating of global crime can only be achieved through 
international cooperation. One country’s success in limiting illicit production and flows often 
results in the displacement of the problem to another state, thereby signaling the need for a 
coordinated response. This has been recognised by the United Nations Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 227 The common threat of organised crime has the 
power to overcome a lack of international integration. Law enforcement institutions are 
constructed to address the crime primarily within national boundaries. As such, a dearth of 
legal cooperation between the U.S. and China enables counterfeiters to exploit Chinese banks 
as financial shelters. A myriad of jurisdictional assertions prohibits cross-border data transfer. 
The U.S. does restrict access to financial information, but allows judges to order the  disclosure 
for lawsuits anywhere in the world that can be used to combat transnational crime.228 However, 
the mechanics of this obligation have not been made entirely clear.  
 
The lack of cooperation on transnational counterfeiting undercuts China’s policies set forth in 
its Trademark Law 2013, which provides that institutions in facilitation of infringements can 
be held liable along with their counterfeiting partners.229 Notably, the law innovatively follows 
a plaintiffs-friendly approach that pre-trial evidence production regarding damages should be 
made available to plaintiffs.230 The provisions represent an important move forward, at least, 
on a statutory basis. If enforced robustly, the current conflict would have been alleviated and 
BoC would not have been put in the conflicting legal obligations imposed by the U.S. and 
Chinese’s laws. This significant move signalises China’s incentive to enhance its reputation on 
IPR protection and willingness to cooperate on discovery procedures. Incrementally, it is 
toward fulfilling its Hague Convention in an expeditious manner. From a positive perspective, 
the conflict could be the indispensable precursor of cooperation. If optimistically interpreted, 
the conflict over the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be a catalyst for the redefinition 
of legitimate sovereign interests in an era of globalisation.231 As Slaughter wisely argued: 
“to reach a new equilibrium, states must work together in a process of redefining 
legitimate interests that can in turn serve as a new or amended basis for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.”232 
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It is thus well-justified to enhance incentives for regulative cooperation in response to the 
transnational challenges.233 The two jurisdictions can advance a constructive dialogue toward 
addressing the most challenging issue. Such an approach is likely to lead to a feasible solution 
in the long term. Since prevention is better than cure, it is imperative to create adequate 
compliance regimes in place to mitigate potential risks. 
 
Conclusion 
Cross-border counterfeiting calls for global enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
The U.S. legal system attempts to provide an efficient method for obtaining evidence located 
abroad to ensure that brand owners are able to attain final relief. The recent cases have 
substantially altered the landscape of extraterritorial discovery. It seems that the scope of the 
U.S. court’s jurisdiction has been considerably restrained. As such, a comparative disadvantage 
compromises the U.S. domestic companies’ position. Absent certain exceptional circumstances, 
a court can exercise general jurisdiction only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with 
the forum. Such a trend, combined with the reaffirmation of the doctrine of separate legal entity 
embodied in Motorola, is likely to impede the plaintiffs to resort to New York court against a 
foreign nonparty. However, Judge Sullivan still compelled the BoC for discovery upon remand 
by the Second Circuit. The common law approaches provide insights based on the court’s 
comity analyses. Arguably, this issue will be addressed if China can show a track record of 
prompt compliance with Hague Conventions requests. The unpredictability enshrined in the 
cases highlights the incompatibility between the Chinese and U.S. legal systems and could have 
far-reaching implications for the ability of U.S. courts to extract information from Chinese 
banks operating in the U.S. Benefitting from access to U.S. capital markets, Chinese firms will 
have to comply with local laws and regulations and subject themselves to U.S. courts and 
litigation. By no means should it be allowed for BoC with a branch in New York to hide 
information concerning assets connected to counterfeiters, even though due process 
considerations should serve as a limit on such requests. Subjecting BoC’s headquarters to U.S. 
law via their New York branches will not imperil, but enhance, the city’s status as a global 
financial center. A more workable standard is highly demanded to accommodate the competing 
concerns of U.S. discovery and Chinese secrecy laws. Although the court might not be the best 
forum to address cross-border counterfeiting, for the sack of global governance, the jurisdiction 
with extraterritorial effect over Chinese banks in the U.S. should provide greater legal 
protections to consumers.  
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